Interview with the Producers of the Rooyat-e-Fath Series

In the Name of God, the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful

Our base during the eight or nine months I was in the operational area was in Ahvaz, not Abadan. I went to the region in mid-Mehr (October 1980 to late Ordibehesht or early Khordad 1981). A month later, the incident of my injury occurred, which prevented me from returning. Thus, my presence in the war zone lasted about eight or nine months. We went to the region about fifteen days after the start of the operations.

Initially, I intended to go to Dezful. That was my intention from here. Then it became clear that Ahvaz needed more support in some respects. Therefore, I went to Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified) to seek permission to go to Ahvaz, which in itself is a story.

I spent the rest of that year entirely in Khuzestan and about two months afterward until late Ordibehesht or early Khordad 1981, I went to the western region and conducted a comprehensive survey of the entire area for the necessary information and things needed; so that we could return and resume our work. Then the events in Tehran occurred, preventing me from going there. During this period, I was mostly in Ahvaz. From the early days, I intended to go to Khorramshahr and Abadan; however, it was not possible. The reason was that there was so much work in Ahvaz that I could not move from the place we were stationed. Because those fighting in Khorramshahr needed to be supported from Ahvaz, as they were not receiving support from anywhere else.

There were generally two types of work there. In the headquarters where we were, the late Dr. Chamran was the commander of that organization, and I was also engaged in tasks there. One type of work was the operations and guerrilla activities in Ahvaz itself, organizing small groups for operations on the battlefield. Of course, in these areas, I was involved to the extent of my ability... The late Chamran also came to Ahvaz with me. We entered Ahvaz together on a plane. They had brought some clothes to the 92nd Division barracks for Chamran's companions. I had no companions. I dismissed all the guards I had. I said, 'I am going to the danger zone; do you want to protect my life!? Protection no longer makes sense!' Of course, a few of them insisted, saying, 'We also want to fight there as Basijis.' I said, 'No problem.' So they were there, doing their own tasks, and had nothing to do with me.

The late Chamran had many companions with him. Perhaps about fifty or sixty people were with him. They brought some military uniforms for them to wear, so we could start from the first night. Friends at the governor's office and the division said, 'Now is the time for tank hunting and guerrilla activities.' He said, 'We will start right now.'

In short, they brought clothes for them. I told the late Chamran, 'How about I wear a uniform and come along?' He said, 'It's good. It's not bad.' I said, 'Then give me a set of clothes too.' They brought a set of military clothes, which was very loose! I am thin now; but back then, I was even thinner. It didn't fit me well. After a few days, they brought a set of non-commissioned officer clothes for me, which incidentally had the armor branch insignia on it. Other branches, after I had been there for a few months and they had become familiar with me, complained about why my uniform was not of the artillery branch? Why not the infantry branch? What is special about armor? So I removed the armor branch insignia so it wouldn't be a privilege for them. Anyway, I wore the uniform and had my own rifle. Although I don't remember if I had brought my rifle or not. The rifle you saw in the film on my shoulder is my own Kalashnikov. I still have it. It is personal and has no connection to the government apparatus. Someone once gifted it to me. It is a special Kalashnikov that, unlike other Kalashnikovs, has a fifty-round magazine. Anyway, I don't remember if I had my own Kalashnikov with me or if I got it there. We went to the operation on the first night. It might have lasted two or three hours, and this was while I didn't know how to fight. I only knew how to shoot. I didn't know how to conduct military operations. Anyway, this was one of our tasks in Ahvaz, which involved forming groups that, in the terminology of those days, went tank hunting. The enemy's tanks had reached 'Dabb Hardan' and were about seventeen, eighteen, or fifteen, sixteen kilometers away from Ahvaz, and their mortars reached Ahvaz. Mortars of 120 or less than 120 also reached Ahvaz.

In any case, the late Chamran organized this military training and education. He designated places for practice. He himself was truly skilled in guerrilla warfare. In the events before the revolution, he had trained in Palestine and Egypt. Unlike us, who had no military background, he had a solid military background and was physically stronger, more experienced, and more skilled than I was. Therefore, when it was discussed who should command this operation, we all unanimously agreed that the late Chamran should be the commander of this organization. We also became part of the staff of that organization.

The second type of work was related to areas outside of Ahvaz, including supporting Khorramshahr and Abadan, and later, the operation to break the siege of Abadan, which started from 'Mohammadiyeh' near 'Darkhovin.' Our current commander, Rahim Safavi, who, God willing, may God preserve these young people for this revolution, was among the first to start the operation to break the siege several months earlier, which later led to the 'Thamen al-A'emmeh' operation.

The point is that the second task was to assist them and deliver mortars. We had to forcibly obtain them from the army. Of course, the army personnel themselves had no objections and willingly provided them. However, at that time, there was a command above the army that strongly prevented anything from being moved, and we, with great difficulty, sometimes obtained something for the Revolutionary Guards brothers. Of course, for our own headquarters, they didn't dare not to give it; because I was there, and Mr. Chamran was also there. I was the representative of Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified).

A few days after we went there (perhaps after two or three weeks), Imam's letter was read on the radio, stating that I and Mr. Chamran were his representatives in all matters of war and so on. These are among the works of Imam Khomeini (may his soul be sanctified). Therefore, we could easily obtain whatever we wanted. However, the Revolutionary Guards, especially those who wanted to go to the region, were in hardship, and one of our tasks was to support them.

I wanted to go to Abadan; but it was not possible. Until one time, I said, 'I must go to Abadan at any cost.' This was when the siege of Abadan had begun. The enemy had crossed the Karun River and moved westward, capturing a bridge there and gradually expanding the bridgehead. It reached a point where the Ahvaz-Abadan road was closed. When they had captured Khorramshahr, the Khorramshahr-Ahvaz road was closed; but the Abadan road was open, and there was traffic on it. When the enemy came to this side and captured the bridgehead and gradually expanded it, that road was also closed. Only the Mahshahr-Abadan road remained. Since Mahshahr connects to the island of Abadan, not to Abadan itself, it also came under fire. That is, the bridgehead was expanded by the enemy, and the third road also came under fire, leaving two or three unreliable routes. One was the waterway, which was also dangerous. Another was the air route, and its problem was that the gentlemen sitting in Mahshahr did not easily provide helicopters to anyone. There was also a dirt road behind the Mahshahr road that the boys had made with great difficulty and crossed with hardship. Of course, parts of it were under direct enemy fire, where we suffered many casualties, and part of this road passed behind embankments. This was different from the main Mahshahr road. Of course, this third road was also quickly closed, and only the two roads remained; that is, the waterway and the air route. I went from Mahshahr to the island of Abadan by helicopter. At that time, from the Revolutionary Guards, the late martyr Jahan Ara was the commander of this operation. From the army, the late martyr Aghareb Parast, one of the martyrs of Isfahan, was there. He was a very good officer. He was an armored officer who went there and stayed. There was also Major Hashemi. I had a photo from this trip, which was a very good photo. I don't know who brought that photo to me. Now, if this is broadcast, whoever brought this photo to me, if they have the film, please prepare that photo again; because it was a very good souvenir photo.

The story was that I was giving a speech at a center belonging to the Fars Basij. There were Shirazis and Tehranis; and it was my first speech upon entering Abadan. No one knew I had come there before. Four or five people were with me, and we said, 'Let's go find the boys.' From the island of Abadan, as we entered the city of Abadan, we went to Khorramshahr. The unoccupied part of Khorramshahr was where the young people were. I went to give a speech for the Basijis. During that speech, a photo was taken of us, which was a very good souvenir. One of the Tajik leaders who came here some time ago saw this photo and liked it very much and took it. It was a unique photo that I didn't see in anyone else's possession. This photo was sent to us as a gift by Major Hashemi. I don't know if Major Hashemi was martyred or not; in any case, I remember there were a few Revolutionary Guards, a few army personnel, and the rest were Basijis.

In the island of Abadan, we visited the former gendarmerie unit. Then we went to visit the Revolutionary Guards' place, which you now call a hotel. I don't know if it was a hotel or not. The place they took us to and we saw was a building that I thought was, for example, a warehouse.

In short, I was in Abadan for no more than one or two days and returned to Ahvaz. I found the situation in Abadan noteworthy. That is, despite the isolation that prevailed over all our combat forces there, the conditions of the combatants in terms of facilities were also unfavorable. It was truly a situation where one could feel the isolation of the Islamic Republic there; because there were very few forces there, and the enemy's threat and pressure were very high and very intense. We only had six tanks there, which Mr. Aghareb Parast had gathered from here and there, repaired, and with great effort had formed a tank company, in fact, an incomplete company. The Revolutionary Guards were fighting with Kalashnikovs, grenades, and mortars, and they had nothing else.

This was our real situation; but the spirits were at their highest. It was truly amazing! Seeing these scenes was very interesting for me. I was there for one or two days, made visits, and my goal was to have an accurate report from there, so to speak, for our work (to see the situation of the region up close and know what to do) and also to say 'God bless you' to the combatants who were there. I went to each of them and said 'God bless you.' I gave speeches everywhere and spoke. I took souvenir photos with the Basiji boys who gathered and returned. This was the summary of my presence in Abadan. Therefore, my presence in Abadan during the entire war was this short period of two or three days, I don't remember exactly, and our base was in Ahvaz. You saw a place in the film where we were passing through houses. This was because the entire area was under the direct view of the enemy, and the Revolutionary Guards, to be able to get themselves to the closest lines to the enemy, which was perhaps about a hundred meters, or less, or more, connected the empty houses of the people who had fled and migrated from Abadan and the empty part of Khorramshahr. I don't remember now if these were in Abadan or Khorramshahr? Most likely, it was Khorramshahr... Yes; it was 'Koot Sheikh.' They had connected these houses and removed the walls.

When one entered these houses, one would see heart-wrenching scenes. We passed through dozens of houses to reach a point where our sniper, with direct fire, targeted the enemy and its patrols. I saw our boys who were snipers and had reached behind fortifications that were directly overlooking the enemy's passage. Of course, as soon as they took someone down, the enemy would bombard that place with heavy fire. It was like that. But they did their job.

This was one part of the houses we went to see. Empty houses with furniture not properly collected, indicating the utmost displacement and misery of people who had left their belongings like that and left. It was very moving! Young people who were advancing with full power kept telling me, 'This place is dangerous.' I said, 'No. We must go and see wherever there is someone!'

The last place we went was under the bridge. The bridge was broken. The Abadan-Khorramshahr bridge was cut off at one point and was not passable. Under the bridge, up to the point of that break, our boys had opened a path and were going, and I went to the end. I think and it seems to me that at that last point we went to, we also performed a congregational prayer. Everywhere I saw heroism and resistance. This was the summary of our several-hour presence in Abadan and the unoccupied area of Khorramshahr, so to speak, Koot Sheikh.

Of course, there was a gap of several months between Imam's statement and the 'Thamen al-A'emmeh' operation, and this task was not carried out immediately. However, Imam correctly identified the issue. When one summarizes, two points were very important for the enemy: one was the end of the connection between Iran and Iraq in the south, which included Abadan and Khorramshahr and the entire island of Abadan. Another point was Dezful. Dezful was important because if they crossed the bridge over 'Karkheh' and threatened Dezful and closed the Dezful road, the entire Khuzestan would be besieged, and our roads would be closed. Therefore, Dezful had strategic importance for the enemy. So you see, the enemy had stationed five or six divisions in front of Dezful. They had filled the entire 'Dasht Abbas.' (I had seen that place up close too.) Another point was the main point. Because the enemy did not want to hold Dezful. Even if they did something, Dezful was not sustainable for them. The place that was important to them was the island of Abadan. They wanted the island of Abadan absolutely. They wanted to have both sides of the Arvand. Therefore, the place that was their ultimate and definite desire, without any doubt, was the island of Abadan, which included Abadan and Khorramshahr. Therefore, these two points were two sensitive points. They captured Khorramshahr in the early days despite that amazing resistance epic. It was such that it was indefensible and was captured. But they could not capture Abadan. The goal was that since they could not come from that side, they would bypass and enter from the island. It was a very calculated move that the enemy was making, and they were advancing step by step and had succeeded. As I said, the island of Abadan was effectively besieged.

Imam pointed to a fundamental point. He said, 'This siege must be broken.' That is, in fact, one of the two main plans and points of the enemy's war and attack, which was the final and definite occupation of this part of Iran, was neutralized by this order of his. It was clear that when Imam gave an order, the youth would go and implement it.

Therefore, the order was a wise and precisely calculated one. From the time Imam said (apparently it was around that time, and now I don't remember the exact date), a group of Revolutionary Guards went and chose a point near the enemy's crossing area from the Karun River, which was approximately around 'Mard.' As far as I remember, its name was 'Mohammadiyeh.' They dug the ground there and entered the trenches near the enemy, without having any facilities. The commander of that group was Rahim Safavi, who regularly came to Ahvaz and asked us for facilities. When I inquired about their work report, I saw that they were advancing step by step. That is, for example, they were initially several kilometers away from the enemy and had gradually gotten closer.

Once he said, 'We attack the enemy from our trenches at night.' That is, the enemy was unaware that they were there and had not discovered them. This was the prelude to the Thamen al-A'emmeh operation. There was a gap of several months between Imam's order and the breaking of the siege. That is, the breaking of the siege of Abadan occurred after the events of the seventh of Tir and the events of the year sixty, and Imam had said this before. That is, it was in the early days of the siege that he said, 'The siege of Abadan must be broken.' But I think there was a gap of six or seven months or seven or eight months.

I do not favor such a large farewell scene and do not think it is a very desirable thing. That particular state in that hall and those young people is not reflected to the viewer to understand the meaning of this scene. Two or three samples are enough. But the state of prayer and prostration, the more you show, the better. Or those statements that non-military people make about the Basijis and chant slogans are good. These are very good; and so are the other events. Except for that farewell scene, which I think is exaggerated.

It is a very interesting and artistic work. If, God willing, you can have strong scripts, making a series is good. Of course, we do not have much problem in terms of artists and actors. We have very strong and good actors. Especially in war work, some have entered the field seriously. But the scripts are often weak. But as he gave an example of that series, I don't know where it was from, the script was very strong. The scripts are so strong, so artistically and precisely arranged that one is truly amazed at how well they have organized them in their minds. This work is a mental and intellectual task.

After that, it is the turn of the director and the actor, which you should think about a bit to be able to produce something that when someone sits for half an hour, forty minutes to watch this film, it has a beginning and an end, and they get something out of it. They should not just string together a series of consecutive events and present them. That is, it should have a theme; even if it is a strong story theme. You should not be too focused on moral themes for each part. Because the essence of this issue has a great theme, and that is enough. That is, the theme of sacrifice, revolution, and war. However, in the end, it should have an acceptable story theme. There should be a story that attracts you.

After that, it is the turn of acting, which should also be very strong, and today the capacity for it exists in the country. You should search and find it. The gentleman you mentioned is a good director. God willing, he can also use good actors. But the documentary part that I insisted on remaining is because of its special role in preserving the atmosphere of war in the country. Not that we want to instill a state of war. Now that there is practically no war. But we want to prevent the feelings and state that existed during the war from being erased from memories. You should see what is appropriate at each time and prepare it. If you can continue the documentary work, in my opinion, it is an important and good task. Of course, in documentary work, the role of speech, the same work that the late martyr Avini did, is very important. Both the writing and the expression of that writing are very, very important. If his insights were not there, many scenes would have no meaning at all.

For a long time, when Rooyat-e-Fath was broadcast, I did not know martyr Avini at all; but I was always a customer of Rooyat-e-Fath. That is, every Friday night, I would definitely sit and watch this program. It had a great impact on me, and I saw how much this speech had an effect. Once those young people came to me (I think they were from Jihad), I said in that meeting, 'This noble voice that narrates these is very interesting; keep it.' He himself was probably in that meeting. No one told me that 'this is the gentleman.' But later he himself wrote to me: 'I am the one who prepares these.' Someone who wants to make such programs must have that nobility, innocence, firmness, and confidence in speech. Sometimes someone says something, and it is a big statement; but it is clear that they themselves do not believe in this statement. But this voice was the voice that made the greatest statements and believed in them. For example, he would say, 'Our young people are more familiar with the paths of the sky than with the paths of the earth.' He would say this as if he had gone, seen, and knew the paths of the sky and knew that they were more familiar! We think a war voice should be a rough and unrefined voice. But he did not have such a voice. It was an innocent and noble voice, yet it had a special firmness; in a strong and artistic written form.

These writings were strong and good writings. He wrote them himself and performed them himself. If you can work on these and prepare something good, even if you cannot provide a half-hour program, it does not matter. A quarter-hour program is also good. Reduce the introduction. A long introduction is not good. No matter how good the introduction is, it should be short. Why? Because it is repetitive. I listen to the introduction of the first program with pleasure. In the second program, this pleasure decreases. By the fourth and fifth program, it is just a repetitive thing. Therefore, the shorter the introduction, the better, and it reduces the fatigue and boredom of repetition. But if you cannot increase the main program, set it for a quarter of an hour, ten minutes. Although martyr Avini himself could not either. I was very grateful for the few programs he prepared after the war. They were really excellent. But they were different from what was during the war.

Producing these in this atmosphere is very difficult. When you produce these, you have to create an atmosphere. You have to put yourself in that atmosphere to be able to produce something good.

Therefore, it is a difficult task. But I believe it is possible. These books that the war children have written from their memories and have been published, I have read many of them and feel that it is possible to recreate that state in the hearts of individuals; even through writing; even through these means. Although it is difficult, it can be done.

In summary, if you can continue this documentary work, it is an interesting thing that, of course, the fictional work will not replace it. God willing, you will be successful.

Peace be upon you and God's mercy and blessings